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The standard Keynesian view of fiscal policy holds that in short-run fiscal adjustments 
(expansions) reduce (stimulate) aggregate demand and due to sticky wages, prices or 
other market rigidities, these demand shifts affect the factors of production and output. 
These conventional predictions have been challenged by the observation of episodes of 
perverse effects of fiscal policy – so called “non-Keynesian” effects.  
This paper reassess the short-run consequences of fiscal policy. We provide evidence 
that consumption reacts in a non-linear fashion to discretionary fiscal policy changes. The 
results of our estimations show that households tend to behave in non-Keynesian manner 
when the fiscal situation of a country is bad, i.e. when public debt or fiscal deficit is large, 
while  Keynesian  behavior  dominates,  when  the  fiscal  situation  is  sound.  Our  results 
suggest that, similarly to OECD countries, consumption function does not react in linear 
fashion to changes in fiscal policy also in transition economies.   
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Introduction  
The adoption of common currency in EU countries has revived interest in the influence 
of fiscal policies on aggregate demand and output. However, despite the efforts of many 
researchers, the short as well as long run effects of fiscal policy still remain unclear.  
The standard Keynesian or “conventional” view of fiscal policy holds that in the short 
run,  fiscal  adjustments  (expansions)  reduce  (stimulate)  aggregate  demand  and  due  to 
sticky wages, prices or other market rigidities, these demand shifts affect the factors of 
production and output. This proposition has been challenged by the permanent income life 
cycle  hypothesis  (PILCH)  and  its  generalization  –  the  Ricardo  –  Barro  Equivalence 
Theorem.  
The strict Ricardian approach holds that the level of aggregate demand is unaffected 
by the tax/debt mix or by permanent changes in government spending – the former leaves 
households’ consumption decisions unaffected, while the latter crowds it out. Fiscal policy 
is thus ineffective in stimulating or dampening output, at least in the short run
1. 
“Real economic life” has, however, demonstrated that here are other options as well, 
and that these theories do not exhaust all the possible effects of fiscal policy. It has been 
well  documented,  that  fiscal  policy  can  have  “non-Keynesian”  effects,  i.e.  that  fiscal 
expansion  can  cause  a  recession  and fiscal  retrenchments  an expansion  in  economic 
activity. These effects do not fit either into Keynesian nor Ricardian tradition and although 
a considerable amount of research has been done concerning these phenomena, they still 
remain  largely  unexplained.  Some  researchers  argue  that  fiscal  policy  has  non-linear 
demand effects – while most of the time the consumers behave in a Keynesian fashion, 
sometimes this effect is totally reversed by a relevant “trigger factor”. Another group of 
researchers  tries  to  explain  the  perverse  effects  of  fiscal  policy  by  linear  supply  side 
effects.  
The main goal of this paper is to reassess the short run effects of discretionary fiscal 
policy.  ,  using  two  data  sets:  a  sample  of  OECD  countries,  already  used  in  previous 
studies and a sample of transition economies. 
The structure of the paper is the following: the first part outlines the main theories on 
the short-run influence of fiscal policies on economic activity, concentrating on possible 
explanations of the non-Keynesian effects and reviews the empirical literature. The second 
and third part are empirical – we run several regressions for OECD as well as transition 
economies to further test the proposition of non-linear effects of fiscal policy.  
                                                 
1 In the long run, the composition and magnitude of government spending, taxes as well as the amount of public debt 





  7 
The  results  of  our  research  support  the  proposition  of  possible n o n - l i n e a r i t y  i n  
consumers’  behavior.  We  find  that  at  times  when  the  fundamental  fiscal  position  of  a 
country is sound, fiscal policy has short-run Keynesian effects: fiscal expansion stimulates 
private consumption while fiscal contraction dampens it. In times of fiscal distress (e.g. of 
doubt as to the solvency of the government) this effect is reversed – loose fiscal policy 
dampens private consumption and vice-versa. Thus households behave in a nonlinear 
fashion – in “normal fiscal times” they are Keynesians, while in “bad fiscal times” they 
employ non-Keynesian behavior. A similar non-linear effect is also present in transition 
economies.  
Our work is another piece in the growing evidence of the presence of non-linear effects 
of  fiscal  policy.  It  has  to  be  emphasized,  however,  that  the  non-linearity  of  consumer 
behavior, which we have found, may not explain fully the perverse reaction of output to 
fiscal policy changes. There might be other factors at work as well – we leave this for 
future research.  
1. Short run output effects of fiscal policy: a reminder  
This  section  briefly  outlines  the  main  competing  theories  on  the  influence  of  fiscal 
policies on aggregate demand
2.  
The simplest Keynesian view assumes that fiscal policy influences aggregate demand 
in a straightforward fashion: fiscal expansion stimulates demand, while fiscal contraction 
reduces  it.  The  size  of  the  aggregate  demand  stimulus  is  given  by  the  Keynesian 
multipliers (the spending multiplier being greater than tax multiplier). In a standard closed 
economy extension of the model (ISLM), the crowding out mechanism, through increased 
interest  rates,  dampens  the  size  of  the  multipliers;  in  the  open  economy  version  (the 
Mundell-Fleming model) the size of the multipliers is also reduced by exchange rate and 
income effects. In both cases however – closed and open economy - the multipliers are 
greater than, or in the extreme case equal to zero; they never turn negative. In the short 
run, due to a positively sloped aggregate supply curve, output follows aggregate demand 
changes. This is what Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) call a “conventional view” of fiscal 
policy. 
There  is  also  another  approach  to  fiscal  policy,  which  challenges  the  conventional 
predictions. It is based on rational, forward-looking consumers and the permanent-income/ 
life-cycle hypothesis (PILCH). A “logical completion” of PILCH is Ricardian Equivalence 
(Seater,  1993,  p.  143).  As  is  well  known,  the  Barro-Ricardo  model  assumes  rational 
consumers  with  infinite  lives  (or  rather  immortal  families  linked  by  intergenerational 
                                                 
2 Comprehensive review can be found in Hemming et al. (2002).  
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altruism),  lump  sum  taxes  and  perfect  capital  markets.  Under  these  assumptions, 
consumption depends only on permanent income and the interest rate. Since consumers 
recognize the government budget constraint, the method of public spending financing does 
not  matter:  it  does  not  change  the  path  of  private  consumption;  the  only  effect  is  the 
altered composition of national savings. For an infinitely lived, forward looking consumer a 
tax  cut  today  is  equivalent  to  a  future  tax  increase  and  thus  does  not  change  his 
permanent income and consumption. Holding government spending fixed, the tax/debt mix 
is irrelevant. That does not imply that fiscal policy as a whole is neutral, because what 
matters is the level of government’s use of resources, i.e. government spending. Provided 
that government spending does not enter into consumers’ utility function, a permanent rise 
in public expenditure means an equal decrease of permanent income, hence an increase 
in government spending, contrary to conventional view, makes the consumer feel less 
wealthy. Note that a permanent change in the path of government expenditure does not, 
on average, change the level of aggregate demand, as any increase in public spending is 
offset by a decrease in consumption (Seater, 1993; Barro, 1989). A temporary increase in 
public  spending,  holding  its  permanent  level  fixed,  will  not  change  the  consumption 
pattern, which may imply a temporary increase in aggregate demand
3.  
The assumption of a forward looking consumer, not restricted by liquidity constraints, 
maximizing his and his descendents lifetime utility renders the Keynesian theory of fiscal 
policy almost completely irrelevant. Of course, if we relax any of these assumptions, the 
results  of  the  PILCH/Ricardo  view  change  –  most  of  the  time  they  become  more 
Keynesian, in the sense, that fiscal policy has Keynesian effects on consumption. The 
results  of  the  Barro  –  Ricardo  model  are  especially  vulnerable  to  a  change  in  the 
assumption  of  infinite  lives.  Allowing  for  a  finite  time  horizon  (or  dismissing 
intergenerational altruism) implies that the method of budget deficit financing does matter, 
as it changes the expected income of (selfish) generations. A tax cut today may raise 
consumption,  as  it  is  possible  that  this  future  tax  increase  will  be  borne  by  next 
generations (Blanchard, 1985): a Keynesian result in the neoclassical framework. Relaxing 
the assumption of lack of liquidity constraints or allowing for myopia also undermines the 
results  of  strict  Ricardian  Equivalence.  The  violation  of  Ricardo  –  Barro  assumptions 
together with the assumption of positively sloped aggregate supply allows for short-run 
expansionary effects of government spending.  
It is obvious that the actual impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand and output 
cannot  be  settled  on  theoretical  grounds  alone,  as  there  are  too  many  unresolved 
questions concerning the crucial assumptions mentioned above – it has to be established 
                                                 
3 The consumption plans might be affected by public spending not only through the budget constraint but also through 
their  utility,  provided  that  government  consumption  enters  into  private  utility  function  –  if  public  consumption  is  a 
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empirically.  The  seminal  paper  by  Campbell  and  Mankiw  (1990)  provides  empirical 
evidence that consumption does not follow a random walk, as implied by PILCH, but is 
“excessively  sensitive”  to  predictable  changes  in  income  and  “excessively  smooth”  to 
surprise changes in income; thus “Keynes’s original consumption function starts to look 
more attractive” (Mankiw, 2002, p. 456).  
There has been also a considerable amount of research devoted to testing Ricardian 
Equivalence;  nevertheless  this  literature  does  not  reach  uniform  conclusions  (Seater, 
1993; Elmendorf, Mankiw, 1998; Lopez, 2000). Some studies reject it; some find evidence 
in favor of it. Part of the reason why the results are so divergent, lies in the fact that most 
of these studies are very sensitive to sample selection, estimation technique and data 
quality. But it seems that “most economists today agree with David Ricardo and doubt that 
Ricardian  Equivalence  describes  actual  consumer  behavior
4”.  (Elmendorf  and  Mankiw, 
1998.  p.  43).  Although  Ricardian  Equivalence/PILCH  might  give  an  approximation  to 
consumer behavior, these concepts do not describe economic reality fully and hence many 
fiscal policy actions do influence aggregate demand and short run economic activity in a 
Keynesian fashion.  
This state of the art has been somewhat challenged in the early 1990’s, as none of 
these theories – neither Keynesian nor PILCH/Ricardian - could explain the phenomenon 
first described in a seminal paper by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, p.81), who analyzed the 
effects of fiscal policy in Denmark and Ireland in, respectively, 1982 and 1987-89 and 
concluded  that  these  were  “…the  two  most  striking  cases  of  expansionary  (fiscal) 
stabilizations in Europe”. Since then, some economists have tried to explain this apparent 
paradox. Below, we sketch the most influential models that explain the so called non-
Keynesian effects: the models by Blanchard (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993), Perotti 
(1999) and Sutherland (1997). All four models are neoclassical (i.e. based on PILCH) and 
each holds that expectations of future fiscal policy changes can give  rise to nonlinear 
consumer behavior.  
Blanchard’s (1990) model is based on the notion, that the larger the tax rate, the larger 
are the distortions in the economy. He assumes a critical level of taxation t*, such that 
distortions  caused  by  taxes,  which  exceed  this  level,  imply  a  decrease  in  output. 
Consequently, there is also an associated critical level of debt d
* that implies, through the 
government budget constraint, a future tax rate above the critical  level  t* and a lower 
output.  
If consumers anticipate that this critical level of debt d
* will be reached, then a fiscal 
consolidation that stabilizes or lowers debt value, allows the economy to escape from the 
highly distortionary tax trap. Thus expected permanent income is higher and consumption 
                                                 
4 Ricardo himself did not belief in the Ricardian Equivalence (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1998)  
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rises. In other words: today’s tax increase, which does not exceed the critical value t* 
allows a larger future increase that would exceed t
* and hence lower output to be avoided. 
As  a  result,  fiscal  consolidation  in  “bad  fiscal  times”  can  be  good  news  and  raise 
consumption.  
Blanchard  notes,  that  if  consumers  have  a  constant  probability  of  death  (are  not 
Ricardian), then “in normal times” i.e. when the economy is far from the critical debt level, 
despite a neoclassical structure of the model, fiscal policy will have Keynesian effects. The 
model thus shows, that consumers behave in a non-linear fashion – in “normal times” they 
behave  in  a  Keynesian  way  (provided  they  have  finite  horizon),  in  “bad  times”  their 
behavior is reversed, which gives rise to non-Keynesian effects.  
The model of Bertola and Drazen (1993) analyzes the effects of public expenditure. It 
assumes that government spending follows a random walk with positive drift. To satisfy 
budget constraint, government is forced, at some points in time, t o discretionary  low er 
expenditure. The model assumes that these fiscal stabilizations are triggered by unique 
levels of government spending g* or g**, which are viewed as critical: the lower value g* 
triggers a stabilization (a decrease of spending to a new level g) with probability p*, which 
is less than one. If g* is surpassed then at a higher value g** stabilization occurs with 
probability equal to one.  
In  “normal  fiscal  times”,  i.e.  far  from  g*,  an  increase  in  public  expenditure  usually 
lowers private consumption, because infinitely lived consumers correctly recognize that 
today’s increase in public spending means increased future taxation and a lowering of their 
permanent income. However, the offset in consumption expenditure is not of equal size to 
the increase in the deficit, because agents know that sometime in the future the increase 
in  government  spending  must  be  reversed.  Hence,  in  general,  despite  the  classical 
character of the model, fiscal policy has weak Keynesian effects.  
More  interesting  is  the  behavior  of  consumption  around  the  “trigger  values”  of 
government spending. When government spending approaches g*, a discrete cut to g is 
possible  but  not  certain  (note,  that  this  possibility  has  been  included  in  consumers’ 
estimate of permanent income). If the trigger value is reached and public spending is not 
cut,  than  consumption  falls  discretely,  as  consumers  revise  their  expectations  of 
permanent income (see Graph 1: movement from point A to C). Thus a non-linearity of the 
model  emerges  –  consumption  falls  significantly  and  discretely,  when  government 
spending increases by a small amount, provided that a fiscal retrenchment was expected, 
but did not materialize. Another nonlinearity is present around the second “trigger value”, 
i.e. when the level of public expenditure is close to g**. Agents know that stabilization will 
certainly take place soon and so they increase their consumption, anticipating lower value 





  11 
level  corresponding  to  the  smaller  public  spending  –  thus  a  large  cut  in  government 
spending leaves consumption unchanged (see Graph 1: a movement from point D to B in 
Graph 1) – there is a nonlinearity in consumption behavior, but aggregate demand still 
falls. 











Source: Bertola and Drazen, (1993), p. 19.  
 
The model developed by Sutherland (1997) has a similar spirit to Bertola and Drazen’s 
model, but contrary to the latter, its results depend crucially on the assumptions of finitely lived 
consumer. Sutherland’s model assumes, that the government implements restrictive fiscal policy, 
in form of a large tax hike, when public debt reaches critical  levels. At low values of debt the 
probability  of  fiscal  contraction  is  very  low,  thus  a  fiscal  transfer  from  the  government  to 
households produces a Keynesian effect, as the probability that the future necessary increase in 
taxes will fall on the current consumer is low. The higher is the debt value, i.e. the closer it is to the 
trigger point of fiscal stabilization, then a further increase in fiscal deficit causes consumption to 
fall, as consumers know that there is a high probability that the stabilization – a large tax increase - 
will take place during their lives and that the future income loss will be much higher than today’s 
government transfer. Again, non-linear consumer behavior gives  rise to non-Keynesian effects. 
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Source: Sutherland, (1997), p. 156 
Another influential model has been developed by Perotti (1999). Similarly to Cambell 
and Mankiw (1990), Perotti (1999) assumes that some consumers are not homogenous: 
one  group  is  rational  and  forward  looking,  while  the  other  group  is  either  liquidity 
constrained  or  myopic,  thus  the  consumption  function  of  the  latter  group  is  purely 
Keynesian.  Perotti  also  implicitly  assumes  that an  increase  in  government  expenditure 
stimulates  pre-tax  income,  while  taxes  dampen  it.  The  distortions  caused  by  taxes 
increase in a non-linear fashion, as taxes enter the output function raised to the second 
power. Because policymakers do not smooth taxes out, future taxes are expected to be 
larger than today’s. 
The non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy in the model emerge when the expectations 
about future disposable income of rational, unconstrained consumers change as a result of 
the unexpected change in public spending or taxes, mainly through alteration of the future 
tax path.
5 Note, that the “Keynesian” consumers have a constant propensity to consume 
out of current income, and the bigger their proportion in the society, the less likely it is for 
the non-Keynesian effects to appear.  
An unexpected increase in public expenditure may exert a positive or negative effect 
on  the  consumption  of  “PILCH”  consumers  depending  on  the  strength  of  the  output 
stimulus as opposed to the negative effect of the implied (future) tax increase. If the output 
stimulus outweighs tax distortions, consumption will increase as a result of the government 
spending shock, if the opposite is true, consumption will decrease. Therefore an increase 
in government spending may have perverse demand effects, provided that the share of 
PILCH consumers is not too low and that the effect of (expected) tax distortions outweighs 
                                                 
5 The “PILCH” consumers do not react to expected changes in fiscal policy. Consumption only changes when fiscal 
policy is unexpected. 
Debt level 
Expected  taxes 
falling on current 
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the  positive  effects  of  spending.  The  latter  effect  is  more  likely  when  the  present 
discounted value of the financing needs of the government is large – for instance when the 
government is struggling with a mounting debt.  
Similarly, a tax increase may have different effects depending on the expected path of 
future taxation. An unexpected tax increase today may stimulate consumption of forward 
looking, unconstrained individuals, as it implies significantly lower tax distortions in the 
future. Again, the emergence of non-Keynesian consumers’ reaction depends on the share 
of unconstrained consumers and on the present discounted value of the financing needs of 
government. In “bad fiscal times” the PDV of the financing needs of government is large, 
so today’s tax increase implies a significant decrease in future distortions.  
Perotti  (1999)  therefore  argues  that  when  the  PDV  of  future  government  financing 
needs is low, fiscal policy will exert the usual Keynesian effects due to the reaction of 
liquidity  constrained  consumers  (provided  that  the  fiscal  action  is  unexpected).  When 
however the PDV of financing needs is high, it is possible that the unexpected fiscal policy 
will  have  perverse  effects,  because  the  PILCH  consumers  expect  a  future  perverse 
change in income. 
The  four  models  summarized  above  emphasize  the  demand-side  sources  of  non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. Some studies however, argue that the main reason of 
non-Keynesian effects lies on the supply side. Alesina et al. (2002) argue that fiscal policy 
may influence investment decisions not only thorough traditional interest rate effects, but 
also through the labor market. They assume that the firm’s investment decision is based 
on  maximization  of  expected  PDV  of  future  cash  flow,  which  in  turn  depends  on  the 
marginal productivity (MP) of capital. The MP of capital is a function of capital labor ratio. A 
permanent increase in wages paid to public sector workers, employment benefits, or labor 
taxes puts upward pressure on labor costs, lowers employment and MP of capital. Thus 
investment demand falls as well. In this model, contrary to the demand side models, the 
reaction to fiscal policy is always linear. 
Lane  and  Perotti  (1999)  emphasize  the  importance  of  the  structure  of  government 
spending  and  taxes  for  the  profitability  and  output  of the tradable goods’ sector. They 
argue  that  an  increase  in  government  spending  on  wages  raises  the  wage  rate  and 
depresses employment and profitability of this sector. Again, there is no non-linearity. 
It is worth noticing (Giudice et al., 2003) that the theoretical (and empirical) literature 
reviewed here suggests that the non-Keynesian effects stemming from the demand side 
should be triggered by a different set of factors than the non-Keynesian effects operating 
through the supply side. For the former the crucial features of fiscal policy are the ones 
that influence agents’ expectations of future policy changes, such as initial fiscal conditions 
(the level of debt, the level of government expenditure) or size of fiscal adjustment. The  
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supply side effects depend almost entirely on the composition of fiscal policy changes, that 
is on relative magnitude of spending cuts (increases) as opposed to tax increases (cuts) 
and on structure of these changes. 
The empirical literature on non-Keynesian effects, starting with the seminal contribution 
of  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  (1990)  almost  uniformly  confirms  the  existence  of  nonlinear 
effects of fiscal policy but this is where consensus ends. The empirical evidence provides 
very mixed conclusions on the “trigger” factors.  
Perotti (1999) finds evidence in favor of non-linear effects of fiscal policy and shows 
that high or growing public debt is the trigger factor. A similar, although weaker conclusion 
has been reached by Bhattacharya (1999). Pozzi (2001) provides additional evidence, in 
the spirit of Perotti’s work, based on data from Canada and Italy.  
Giavazzi et al. (2000) fail to find the significance of excessive debt in triggering non-
linear  effects.  In  their  estimation  the  relevant  factor  is  the  size  of  the  adjustment/ 
expansion: they find that large and persistent fiscal policy changes trigger non-linearity.  
Cour  et  al.  (1996)  fail  to  find  any  strong  relationship  between  the  size  of  fiscal 
expansion/contraction and non-Keynesian effects.  
Alesina et al. (1998) provide evidence that composition of fiscal policy is the factor that 
causes the non-Keynesian effects. Similarly, Alesina and Perotti (1997) argue that the 
composition of fiscal adjustment is crucial for its macroeconomic effects. 
Pozzi, Heylen and Dossche (2002) find somewhat contrary evidence to the existence of 
demand-side non-Keynesian effects. They test the influence of rising government debt on 
the proportion of liquidity-constrained consumers and find that as the debt increases so do 
liquidity constraints
6. Although they do not explicitly test for the non-linear effects of fiscal 
policy,  their  evidence  suggests  that  “bad  fiscal  times”  increase  the  proportion  of 
“Keynesian” consumers, which should make the emergence of non-Keynesian effects less 
likely
7.  
Hence, the literature, being far from conclusive, points to the size and composition of 
fiscal  adjustment/expansion  and  initial  fiscal  conditions  (deficit  and  debt  levels),  as 
possible  factors  that  influence  the  probability  of  non-Keynesian  effects.  However,  as 
Giudice et al. (2003) remind us, these results as well as comparison between different 
works, has to be treated with caution. Most studies define fiscal expansions/adjustments 
based  on  different  criteria;  therefore  the  comparability  between  them  is  limited.  The 
empirical work tends to skip fiscal reforms that don’t produce immediate fiscal effects, but 
nevertheless are very important, such as social security system reforms, what might lead 
                                                 
6 They argue that as public debt increases, banks may reduce the amount they lent to households. 
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to biased results. Moreover, there might be also a bias in sample selection, as most of the 
fiscal contraction that were aborted because of deep recession, are missing from the data.  
Summing up: the effects of fiscal policies are unclear from the theoretical as well as 
empirical  perspective.  There  are  three  distinctive  theoretical  views  on  the  short  run 
consequences of discretionary government actions: first, the Keynesian or conventional 
view that says that fiscal expansions or adjustment have symmetrical effects on demand 
and output, second, the PILCH/Ricardian view, which holds that  fiscal policy is largely 
irrelevant and the third view – the non-Keynesian approach, that proposes that fiscal policy 
can have perverse effects, among others, due to non-linearities – it might be Keynesian or 
Ricardian (depending on assumptions) in good times, but in bad fiscal times or in the case 
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Table 1. Review of empirical literature on non-Keynesian effects.  
Authors  Method of research  Sample  Results. 
Afonso, 2001  Regression analysis, 
consumption function 
EU-15  Evidence of non-linear consumer behavior around large changes in 
primary structural budget balance; thus size of adjustment may trigger 
non-Keynesian effects; but the magnitude of reversal is too weak to 





OECD  Evidence of non-Keynesian effects. Size of adjustment and 
composition are the factors that seem to influence the likelihood of 







OECD  Non-Keynesian effects are possible. Increases in primary 
government spending reduce profits and investment: the strongest 
effect is caused by the government wage bill; increases in taxes reduce 
profits and investment, but the magnitude is smaller. Composition of 
fiscal policy is thus crucial for non-Keynesian effects. 
Alesina, Perotti,  
1997 
Statistical analysis  OECD  Evidence of Non-Keynesian effects. Composition of fiscal adjustment 
is important factor triggering these effects.  
Bhattacharya, 1999  Regression analysis 
for each country plus 
panel data approach;  
dependent variable 
consumption,  
OECD  Evidence of non-linear behavior – households move from non-
Ricardian to Ricardian behavior as government debt reaches a 
threshold; debt level and debt history is important for the effects of fiscal 
policy;  
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Table 1. Review of empirical literature on non-Keynesian effects (cont’d). 




VAR; effects of fiscal 
variables on GDP 
US, postwar period; 
quarterly data 
Keynesian results, but the multipliers are small;  
increases in T and G both have strong negative effects on investment 
spending (Keynesian theory predicts that the signs should be 
opposite).   
Consumption is crowded in by increases in spending, but exports and 
imports are crowded out 
Cour, Dubois, 
1996 
Statistical and regression 
analysis; dependent 
variable: consumption;  
OECD, 1971-95  Statistical analysis: evidence of non-Keynesian effects; large fiscal 
adjustments and expansions seem to be less Keynesian; and anti-
Keynesian episodes are specific to large scale fiscal episodes;  
Regression analysis: consumption behavior does account for non-
Keynesian effects, however it is difficult to identify factors that may be 
the cause of this non-linearity;  













Evidence of non-linear effects of fiscal policy; the factor 
explaining non-linearity is the size of fiscal adjustment/expansion 
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Table 1. Review of empirical literature on non-Keynesian effects (cont’d). 




Regression analysis; dependent 
variable: consumption 
19 OECD countries, 
1970-1992 
Evidence of non-linearity: non-Keynesian reaction of 
consumption function emerges when changes in cyclically 
adjusted deficits are particularly large and persistent; size of 




descriptive and regression analysis 
(consumption) 
Denmark and Ireland  Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations; evidence of 




Authors analyze RECESSION 
EPISODES only; statistical and 
econometric analysis;  
dependent variable: depth of recession 
29 advanced 
economies, 1970-99;  
61 recession 
episodes 
Statistical analysis: fiscal expansions are more effective (i.e. 
have Keynesian effects), when: 
•  debt is low 
•  govt. is big 
•  are expenditure based 
Estimation: fiscal policies have Keynesian effects in closed 
economies, non-Keynesian effects in open economies;  
govt. size matters – big governments have more Keynesian 
effects (because of larger automatic stabilizers). 
Lane, Perotti, 
1999 
Regression analysis; dependent 
variable: employment, real value 
added and profitability in 
manufacturing (supply side) 
OECD, 1964-1994  Negative effect of government wage spending on output 
profitability and employment in the traded goods sector; 
composition of fiscal policy matters for its effect  
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Table 1. Review of empirical literature on non-Keynesian effects (cont’d). 
Authors  Method of research  Sample  Results. 
Miller, 
Russek, 2002 
Regression analysis: St. 
Luis equation, consumption 
equation and growth 
accounting equation 
OECD  St Luis equation: evidence of nonlinear effects around large and 
persistent fiscal expansions; 
Consumption equation – non-linear behavior around large fiscal 
expansions, but not large enough to explain non-Keynesian effects, 
these effects are magnified by the inclusion of “trigger points” i.e. 
dummies for exceptionally high and rapid growth of government 
consumption and primary structural deficit 
Growth accounting equation: no non-linearity found 
McDermott, 
Wescott, 1996 
statistical and regression 
analysis of fiscal 
adjustments 
OECD 1970-1995  Non-Keynesian effects emerge during successful fiscal consolidations 
(i.e. consolidations that resulted in at least 3 percentage points 
reduction in public debt to GDP in the second year after the fiscal 
adjustment has ended). The success of fiscal consolidations depends 
on its size (bigger ones being more successful); and on composition: 
successful ones are achieved mainly through spending cuts 
Perotti, 2002  VAR  5 OECD countries  Overall small multipliers; smaller (and in some countries negative) 
multipliers in the post 1980-sample, as compared to pre 1980.  





Evidence of non-linearity: non-Keynesian effects emerge when 
government debt is high 
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Table 1. Review of empirical literature on non-Keynesian effects (cont’d). 
Authors  Method of research  Sample  Results. 
Pozzi, 2001  Regression analysis: 
consumption function 
semi-annual data for 
Italy and Canada 
1960/1-1997 
Evidence of non-linearity: when debt ratio raises, tax 





OECD, 1990-1999  High government debt increases the share of credit-
constraint consumers. 
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2. A preliminary look at the data. 
In this and in the next section we try to assess how pronounced are the non-Keynesian 
effects and  what factor  might  trigger  them.  As  a  pre-examination  of  the possible non-
Keynesian effects, we perform a simple statistical analysis of the cases of significant fiscal 
expansions and adjustments in OECD countries in years 1975-2001. We limit our analysis 
to large fiscal expansions and adjustments, in order to isolate those fiscal impulses that 
might generate easily perceptible output consequences. Our goal in this simple statistical 
survey is not to gauge the effects of every fiscal adjustment or expansion but to distil the 
cases that may exert a strong effect, undoubtedly Keynesian or non-Keynesian (to the 
extent  that  this  methodology  allows  for  strong  conclusions),  and  to  try  to  assess  the 
differences between them. We define a large fiscal expansion/adjustment as those cases 
when the cyclically adjusted primary government budget balance, measured as percent of 
potential GDP, changes by +/- 1.5 percentage point of potential GDP in at least one year.  
As a measure of the output effects of fiscal policy change, we  use the concept of 
“corrected growth” developed by Cour et al. (1996). Corrected growth of country i equals 
the actual growth of country i minus the average, actual growth in G7 countries and minus 
the difference between the potential growth rates between country i and G7. A “Keynesian” 
fiscal  adjustment/expansion  is  an  episode,  during  which  the  “corrected  growth”  is 
smaller/larger  than  in  the  preceding  year.  An  episode  is  “non-Keynesian”  when  fiscal 
adjustment/expansion is coupled with a “corrected growth” which is larger/smaller than in 
the preceding year.  
We  isolated  40  cases  of  significant  fiscal  expansions  and  73  cases  of  fiscal 
adjustments. Out of these 113 significant fiscal policy changes, 50 were non-Keynesian. 
Thus, a first conclusion emerges – non-Keynesian effects are not a random anomaly, they 
seem to be quite a frequent phenomenon. Table 2 gives the basic statistics.  
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Table 2. Keynesian and non-Keynesian episodes of fiscal policy in OECD countries in years 1976-
2001. 








Number of episodes  17  23  46  27 
Average  change  of  the 
cyclically  adjusted  primary 
govt. balance, in % of potential 
GDP.  
-2,47  -2,62  2,24  2,53 
Average “adjusted growth”  1,58%  -1,38  -1,72  1.01 
Source: own calculations, OECD database 
 
To  verify  what  factors  might  increase  the  probability  of  the  occurrence  of  non-
Keynesian episodes of fiscal policy, we estimate a logit model. The dependent variables is 
the  occurrence  of  Keynesian  or  non-Keynesian  effect  of  fiscal  policy.  The  explanatory 
variables are the size of government debt, cyclically adjusted, in % of potential GDP and 
the composition of adjustment – i.e. the size of revenue and expenditure change both 
cyclically adjusted.  
Tables 3 and 4 give the estimation results, which are not encouraging. The estimation 
does  not  identify  any  significant  factors  influencing  the  probability  of  non-Keynesian 
outcome in case of fiscal adjustments. In case of fiscal expansions, public revenue as well 
as expenditure are statistically significant, but the expenditures’ variable has the wrong 
sign. According to Alesina et al. (1999), a decrease in public expenditures should stimulate 
investment. Therefore an increase in expenditures should make a non-Keynesian effect of 
fiscal expansion (i.e. a GDP decline) more probable. Our estimation suggest the opposite 
–  that  the  probability  of  non-Keynesian  results  decreases  when  expenditures  are 
increased . Such result, together with insignificant explanatory variables in case of the 
regression depicted in Table 3 suggest that the estimation concerning fiscal expansions is 
simply  spurious.  Hence,  the  simple  logit  estimation  has  not  given  us  any  clues  as  to 
whether the non-Keynesian effects are triggered by the composition of fiscal adjustment 
which would point to the importance of supply side effects in explaining the non-Keynesian 
effects, or by the initial fiscal conditions which would indicate the importance of demand 
side factors. 
Thus, our data does not allow us to assess which approach: demand sided or supply 
sided - is superior. Of course, the existence of non-Keynesian effects on the demand side 
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Table 3. Probability of non-Keynesian effect of fiscal adjustment (logit estimation). 
Variable  Coefficient  z-Statistic  Prob. 
∆ revenue  -0,1368432     -0.44     0,663 
∆ expenditure  -0,1386428     -0,42  0.674     
debt  -0,0050307     -0,53  0.598     
Pseudo R2 = 0.0117                                                                              Number of obs = 64 
Source: Own calculation 
Table 4. Probability of non-Keynesian effect of fiscal expansion (logit estimation). 
Variable  Coefficient  z-Statistic  Prob. 
∆ revenue  0,9698169     2,10  0,036 
∆ expenditure  -1,012933     -1,88  0.060      
debt  -0,0104363     -0,57  0.568     
Pseudo R2 = 0.1737                                                              Number of obs = 30 
Source: Own calculation 
 
In this situation, we decided to pursue further the demand side approach and leave the 
supply  side  factors  for  future  research.  As  the  traditional  Keynesian  analysis  is 
fundamentally concerned with demand side, we wanted to verify whether it is possible that 
this  channel  could  really  the  source  of  the  perverse  effects.  Once  again,  we  want  to 
emphasize, that demand-side approach does not exclude the supply side effects.  
3. Empirical evidence. 
Following the conclusion of Cour et al. (1996) that consumption seems to be a good 
candidate to explain non-Keynesian effects, we concentrate our research precisely on this 
component of aggregate demand. The goal of our estimation is modest – we want to verify 
whether  there  is  non-linearity  in  consumption  induced  by fiscal events.  Note  that  non-
linearity does not necessarily imply a non-Keynesian output effect. As it may be too weak 
to offset the other effects of fiscal policy it simply signals that the overall impact of fiscal 
policy might not be uniform.  
Our  estimation  is  based  on  the  methodology  of  Perotti  (1999)  and  Campbell  and 
Mankiw (1990), followed, among others by Pozzi et al. (2002).  
Following Perotti (1999), we model consumption changes as a function of expected 
disposable income changes and unexpected fiscal policy changes. The expected income 
changes will give rise to a change in consumption of the liquidity constrained or myopic  
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consumers. Unexpected fiscal policy shocks will cause both groups of consumers to adjust 
their consumption path. Note that expected changes will not affect the consumption of 
unconstrained,  forward  looking  consumers,  and  the  reaction  of  myopic  consumers  to 
expected  policy  changes  is  already  imbedded  in  the  coefficient  of  disposable  income 
changes. Since we are interested in the reaction to discretionary policy changes , we use 
cyclically  adjusted  fiscal  impulses.  The  cyclical  adjustment  als o  a l l o w s  u s  t o  a v o i d  
problems with endogenity of fiscal variables, The fiscal impulse is measured as the change 
in difference between personal income together with social security taxes and primary 
government expenditures.  
We estimate the following consumption function:  
 
∆cit = ∆yit +∆balit +∆balit*D1it + eit                                      (1) 
 
where: 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆cit – consumption change 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆yit – expected change in disposable personal income 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆bal  –  unexpected,  cyclically  adjusted  fiscal  impulse,  defined  as  personal  income 
taxes and social security contributions minus primary expenditures 
D1 - dummy variable that equals 1, when the government debt in a country exceeds its 
mean plus one standard deviation computed for the period 1970- 2001 (i.e. the mean and 
standard deviation are computed separately for each country). To check the robustness of 
our results, we also employ a different definition of this variable and then denote it as 
D1WS. This dummy equals one, when the government debt in a country exceeds the mean 
plus one standard deviation computed for the whole sample.  
All the variables are in real per capita terms; consumption and income are expressed 
in log differences; the change in budget balance is, following Perotti (1999), expressed as 
a real per capita change divided by real per capita disposable income (this is done to take 
into account the significant cross-country differences in the size of budget deficit). All data 
comes from the OECD database.  
Before we actually estimate equation (1) we must compute the expected changes in 
disposable  income  and  the  unexpected  changes  in  fiscal  policy  shocks.  These  are 
calculated using a system of VAR equations: 





i t X  + υt,  
where:  
Xt = (∆ct, ∆yt, ∆balt) 
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The estimated error terms represent the unexpected variations in variables, while the 
estimated dependent variables are the expected changes.  
We estimate equation (1) on panel data for OECD countries (except for Poland, the 
Czech  Republic  and  Hungary)  for  the  years  1970-2001  using  a  simple  within-effects 
estimator, which is a consistent estimation procedure in the case of generated regressors 
(see Perotti, 1999, Pozzi, 2001).  
Table 5 summarizes our results.  
Table 5. Estimation results; OECD countries; dependent variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆cit. 
Dependent Variable: ∆cit 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1973 2000, Number of cross-sections used: 19 
Estimation 1  Estimation 2  Estimation 3 
Variable 
Coeff.  t-Stat.  Prob.   Coeff.  t-Stat.  Prob.   Coeff.  t-Stat.  Prob.  
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆yit  0.666  9.299  0.000  0.656  9.152  0.000  0.653  9.11  0.000 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆balit  -0,213 
 
-1.725  0.085  -0.336 
 
-2.305  0.022  -0.437  -2.474  0.013 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆balit*D1      0.428 
 
1.575  0.116      
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆balit*D1ws         0.439  1.768  0.077 
R-squared: 0.259122                 
 Adjusted R-squared: 0.213 
F-statistic: 59.10769 
Prob(F-statistic): 0.000000         
Durbin Watson stat.:1. 798213 
R-squared: 0.253685 












The coefficient signs in the estimation 1, without the dummy variable, are consistent 
with  the  Keynesian  view;  however  the  inclusion  of  the  dummy  variable  for  “bad  fiscal 
times”, i.e. large government debt (estimation 2 and 3) uncovers the non-Keynesian effect: 
in bad fiscal times an increase in government spending dampens consumption. This non-
linear effect was predicted by the Sutherland, Blanchard and Bertola and Drazen models, 
and empirically proven, among others, by Perotti (1999). In times of fiscal distress the 
households  change  their  behavior  from  Keynesian  to  that  resembling  the  Ricardian 
proposition.  
We also run another set of regressions to test for the influence of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (Table 5, Equation 3). Fiscal rules (like the Stability and Growth Pact) should 
make  the  non  -  Keynesian  effects  more  pronounced  –  a  fiscal  rule  that  requires  a  
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reversion of policy, when a deficit and/or debt exceeds a certain threshold, might make an 
otherwise myopic consumer more aware of government budget constraint. Secondly, the 
adoption of fiscal rules makes a fiscal contraction more probable in the short time horizon 
(the issue of time horizon is discussed in Sutherland’s model).  
We test the influence of Stability and Growth Pact by multiplying the budget balance 
variable by two dummies: D1 (or D1ws), which as before, equals one in “bad fiscal times” 
and D2 or (1-D2), where D2 = 1 for countries that have adopted Stability and Growth Pact. 
The variable ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆balit*D1*D2 (which means that a country has adopted Stability and Growth 
Pact  and  was  experiencing  “bad  fiscal  times”)  is  statistically  insignificant,  the  variable 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆balit*D1ws*D2  (which  has  similar  meaning,  but  D1ws  is  computed  differently  than  D1) 
performs  better.  It’s  coefficient  is  larger  in  absolute  value  than  the  coefficient  of  the 
variable ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆bal*D1*(1-D2) (which means that a country is experiencing bad fiscal times but 
has  not  (yet)  adopted  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact),  which  might  suggest  that  the 
adoption of Stability and Growth Pact makes the perverse effect of fiscal policy stronger. 
This is a very interesting result, which should be tested in a few years time, when we have 
more data points available.
8 
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Table 6. Estimation results; OECD countries; dependent variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆cit 
Dependent Variable: ∆consit 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1973 2000, Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 360 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Stat.  Prob.   Coefficient  t-Stat.  Prob.   
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆yit  0.657  9.144880  0.000  0.654  9.117  0.000 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆balit  -0.336  2.300517  0.022  -0.433  -2.433  0.014 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆balit*D1*(1-D2)  0.400  1.400070  0.162      
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆balit*D1 *D2  0.614  0.932356  0.352      
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆balit*D1ws*(1-D2)       0.308  1.476  0.140 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆balit*D1ws *D2       0.804  1.576  0.115 
R-squared: 0.259335                        F-statistic: 39.33208 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.21098      Prob(F-statistic): 0.000 
Durbin-Watson stat: 1.797959 
R-squared: 0.261, F-statistic: 39.879 
Adj. R-squared:0.213,  Prob(F-statistic): 
0.00 
Durbin-Watson stat: 1.776 
 
In the next regression we test for the presence of non-linear effect of fiscal policy in 
transition economies. Data availability allows us to include only the following economies in 
our sample: Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovak Republic. The earliest 
data point is year 1990 and the latest is 2001.  
Due to the short time dimension of the data, we decided not to estimate the VAR, thus 
both the changes in income as well as in fiscal shock are not divided into expected and 
unexpected components. All variables are in real per capita terms. The budget balance 
variable  is  scaled  by  real,  per  capita  GDP,  while  consumption  and  income  are  log 
differences. The fiscal data is from GFS, while consumption and GDP is taken from World 
Bank Development Indicators.  
Since we do not have data for disposable income, we proxy it by GDP. The budget 
balance data is for consolidated central government and is not cyclically adjusted. Due to 
unavailability of a full dataset on government debt, we use budget deficits to proxy for “bad 
fiscal times”; thus times of fiscal distress for a given country i (dummy D1it=1)  are defined 
as  the  mean  plus  one  standard  deviation  of  the  budget  deficit  for  country  i o v e r  t h e  
relevant time period
9.  
                                                 
9 We ran a regression for the very limited sample of countries, for which we had public debt data (i.e. D1=1 when the 
public debt of a country is excessively large), but then the deficit variable turned out to be not statistically significant.   
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Estimation of a consumption function that employs GDP and unadjusted fiscal data 
poses many econometric problems, one of them being the endogenity of the right hand 
side variables. To (partly) account for this problem, we employ the two-step instrumental 
variable estimation technique
10.  
Table 7. Estimation results for transition economies; dependent variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆cit 
Dependent Variable: ∆cit 
Method: Fixed effects 2stage IV regression  
Sample: 1990 2001, Number of cross-sections used: 14 
Var.  Coefficient  t-Stat  Prob  Coefficient  t-Stat  Prob  Coefficient  t-Stat  Prob 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆gdp  0.8795  6.42  0.000  0.8945  6.54  0.000  0.9440  3.04  0.004 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆bal  -0.4102  -2.12  0.037   -0.6213  -2.53  0.013  -1.6625  -0.24  0,809 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆bal*D1       0.1544  1.42  0.158  0.4251  0.04  0,971 
Instrument
s: 
∆gdp instrumented by 
∆bal ∆gdp-1  
∆gdp  and  ∆bal 
instrumented  by  ∆gdp-1 
∆cons-1 ∆def-2 
  R-sq: within =  0.60  R-sq: within = 0.61  R-sq: within = 0.3614 
 
The estimation results suggest that in the transition economies, non-linear reaction by 
consumers  to  changes  in  fiscal  policy  might  also  be  present.  Note  however,  that  the 
coefficient of ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆bal*D1 (that is the influence of budget balance in times of fiscal distress) is 
smaller in absolute value than the coefficient of ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆bal, which means that fiscal expansion in 
“bad fiscal times” increases consumption but this effect is much weaker than in “good 
fiscal times”. Thus, it seems that the consumers in transition economies do behave in a 
non-linear  fashion  but  the  non-Keynesian  effect  does  not  outweigh  the  Keynesian 
response, so on average there are no perverse reactions of consumption to fiscal policy.  
This  result  is  not  surprising  –  as  Perotti  (1999)  argues,  the  non-Keynesian  effect 
depends, among others, on the proportion of myopic and liquidity constrained consumers. 
In transition economies liquidity constraints are probably much more pronounced due to 
less developed financial markets. Moreover, the proportion of myopic consumers may be 
also greater. The citizens of formerly centrally planned economies may still not be familiar 
with  the  concept  of a  government  budget constraint  and may  not  understand  that  the 
resources  of  government  are  limited.  These  results  must,  of  course,  be  treated  with 
skepticism, due to the short time period concerned and the poor quality of the data.  
                                                 
10 We also ran a regression with dummy variables for the well known output shock (Russian crisis, Bulgarian crisis, 
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4. Conclusions 
The short-run effects of fiscal policy, despite the effort of many researchers, are still a 
matter of controversy. The compromise position held by most economists is that the strict 
PILCH/Ricardian view, although theoretically interesting, is empirically fairly irrelevant so 
fiscal policy will have Keynesian effects in the short run.  
These  simple  predictions  have  been  shaken  by  the  observation  of  episodes  of 
perverse effects of fiscal policy – so called “non-Keynesian” effects. These effects might 
be caused, among other reasons, by nonlinear consumer behavior that changes in times 
of fiscal distress.  
The main goal of our paper was to test for the existence of this non-linearity. We found 
evidence  that  consumption  reacts  in  a  non-linear  fashion  to  discretionary  fiscal  policy 
changes. The results of our estimations show that in “normal fiscal times” the consumers 
behave in Keynesian fashion. In “bad fiscal times” their behavior tends to change – an 
expansionary fiscal policy lowers consumption, which is definitely not a Keynesian result.  
These results are not novel – they confirm the empirical conclusions reached by Perotti 
(1999) and are in line with the theoretical models of Sutherland (1997) and Blanchard 
(1990). We also found, that these non-Keynesian effects may be reinforced by the Stability 
and Growth Pact (but, the very limited number of data points available do not allow us to 
reach definite conclusions). This result is especially appealing, as it reinforces the validity 
of the proposition, on which the models of Blanchard (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993) 
and Sutherland (1997) are based, namely that expectations of future fiscal policy changes 
influence today’s consumer behavior.
11  
We  have  also  tried  to  verify  the  presence  of  non-Keynesian  effects  in  transition 
economies. As usual, the short time horizon and poor quality of the data are the reason 
that any estimation results must be treated with considerable caution. Our results suggest 
that in transition economies, similarly to OECD countries, the consumption function does 
not react in linear fashion to changes in fiscal policy. When the fiscal policy is sound, fiscal 
expansion stimulates consumption; this “conventional “ effect is also present in “bad fiscal 
times” but is much weaker – the increase in consumption is close to zero. This result is 
consistent with the Perotti’s (1999) model; Perotti argues that the perverse effect of fiscal 
policy is dependent on the fraction of myopic and liquidity constrained consumers – the 
bigger is this proposition the less likely the non-Keynesian effect. In transition economies 
this proportion is probably larger than in OECD economies for two reasons – first, financial 
                                                 
11 As far as we know, the influence of the Stability and Growth Pact has not been so far described in the literature on 
non-Keynesian effects. It is certainly worthwhile to verify this result in a couple of year’s time, when more data points is 
available.   
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markets are less developed, so probably more consumers are liquidity constrained and 
secondly more consumers might be myopic – the consequence of many years of centrally 
planning and a lack of familiarity with the operation of the government budget constraint in 
a market-economy setting. This proportion of “Keynesian consumers” will probably have a 
tendency  to  fall  over  time,  thus  the  transition  economies  are  likely  to  see  the  non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policy grow.  
Also, our findings are not very good news for those EU politicians that would like to 
stimulate the economy through fiscal expansion. Expansionary fiscal policy, especially in 
the countries which have adopted Euro, may not always have the usual effects!  
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